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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TANGREN FAMILY TRUST, by
RICHARD TANGREN, Trustee and
RICHARD TANGREN, Individually,
Appellate Ct. No.20005-0085

Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
RODNEY TANGREN,
Defendant-Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant
to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2001 as Amended).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented by this appeal are as follows:
First, did the trial court commit error with regard to its statement of legal principles
governing the construction and interpretation of lease agreements and associated issues
raised by the Counterclaim in this case. The issue was preserved by the trial memorandum
and objection to the introduction of parol evidence (R. 102-121; Tr. Vol. 1, 9:2-13; 53:12
to 54:9; 72:6-11; 177:2-17; Vol 2, 11:13-25; 32:15 to 33: 8; 240:9 to 258:6). Conclusions
of law are reviewed for correctness and reviewed de novo. Southern Title Guaranty. Co., v.
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Bethers, 761 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah App. 1988). A district court's determination of the proper
standard of proof, from prevailing case law, is reviewed for correctness. See generally State
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) ("Legal determinations . . . are defined as those
which are not of fact but are essentially of rules or principles uniformly applied to persons
of similar qualities and status in similar circumstances."); see also Hansen v. Hansen, 958
P.2d 931, 933 (Utah Ct.App.1998); In re R.N J., 908 P.2d 345, 349 (Utah Ct.App.1995).
Second, did the trial court, based upon the facts of this case, commit error in
concluding that the Lease Agreement, which is the subject was this action, was invalid,
based upon parol evidence testimony as to the intent of the parties that contradicted the
explicit terms of the written Lease Agreement. The issue was preserved by the trial
memorandum and by objection to the introduction of parol evidence (R. 102-121; Tr. Vol.
1,9:2-13; 53:12to 54:9; 72:6-11; 177:2-17; Vol2,11:13-25; 32:15 to33: 8;240:9to258:6).
This Court reviews the conclusions of the trial court for correctness, without deference to its
decision. Holmes Dev.y LLC v. Cook 48 P.3d 895 (Utah 2002); Speros v. Fricke, 98 P.3d 28
(Utah, 2004).
Third, did the trial court fail to make adequate findings of fact, upon which the Order
of the trial court could be based. The findings must be sufficiently detailed to allow the
reviewing court the information necessary to review the trial court's decision. State v. James,
858 P.2d 1012,1015 (Utah 1993). As noted by the Court in Jensen v. Jensen, 775 P.2d436
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), adequate findings are those that (1) are sufficiently detailed, (2)
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include enough facts to disclose the process through which the ultimate conclusion is
reached, (3) indicate the processes logical and properly supported, and (4) are not clearly
erroneous. The failure of the trial court to make findings on all material issues is reversible
error. Epstein v. Epstein, 741 P.2d 974 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OR STATUTES
There are no determinative constitutional or statutory provisions upon which
Appellant relies.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The claims of the parties in this action are centered around the validity of a Lease
Agreement executed by the parties. Each of the parties hereto brought claims against the
other party relevant to the validity, interpretation, enforcement and breach of the Lease
Agreement and for damages and other relief associated with the parties interaction under the
terms thereof. The Defendant/Appellant maintains that the Lease Agreement is a viable
enforceable contract. The Plaintiff contends that the Lease Agreement is invalid. The trial
court, without a jury, determined that the Lease Agreement was invalid and denied any
further relief to the parties on their respective claims.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

The Acquisition of the Land Described in the Lease by the Tangren
Family Trust

Richard L. Tangren, the trustee of the Plaintiff trust, had resided in Las Vegas,
3

Nevada since 1955 (Tr. Vol. 1, 14:7-15). In the late fifties, he had gone into business with
his brother in a cattle operation acquired from a Mr. Ralph Miller. Mr. Tangren's brother had
acquired the lease rights to the property on the Green River from Mr. Miller and Mr.
Tangren purchased Mr. Miller's cattle (Tr. Vol. 1, 14:25 to 15:13). The lease was
subsequently lost, in the seventies, because of the federal government's acquisition of the
land for a national park (Tr. Vol. 1, 15:14 to 16:9).
As a result, the Tangrens moved their cattle operation to unimproved land along the
Colorado River, which land is that ultimately described in the Lease Agreement, which is
the subject of this action. The land was leased by the Tangren brothers from the State of
Utah, SILTA (State Institutional Trust Lands) and the BLM. (Tr Vol. 1, 16:10 to 17:10).
Mr. Tangren's brother, who had been "rode out" by his wife, decided to build a house on the
land (named by the Tangrens as the Tangri-la Ranch), but was unsuccessful in blasting the
cliff that was required in order to build (Tr. Vol. 1, 17:9 to 18:11). The attempt to build a
house on land leased from the State created a major altercation with State representatives,
who accused Mr. Richard Tangren of lying to them (Tr. Vol. 1, 18:21 to 19:22).
The Tangrens decided that the cattle business was not working out and began
exploring alternative uses of the land (Tr. Vol. 1, 20:1 to 20:9). In addition, the Tangrens
were having continued problems with the State of Utah over "junk" that had been
accumulated on the leased property (Tr. Vol. 1, 20:11-24). It took the Tangrens from 19^3
to 1980 to acquire a deed from SITLA for ninety-five acres and another four years to acquire
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the remaining forty acres from the BLM (Tr. Vol. 1, 21:2-10). As of 1980 or 81, the
Tangrens had acquired title to the 135 acres of unimproved property and placed it in the
Tangren Family Trust (Tr. Vol. 1,21:11 -20). The real property, at all times relevant hereto,
was owned by the Tangren Family Trust. Richard Tangren is the trustee of the trust and the
Tangren children, including the Defendant, are the beneficiaries (Tr. Vol. 1, 247:15 to
249:4).
B.

Building and Construction on the Trust Property.

The Tangrens decided to build a house-lodge structure on the land. It was intended
that Mr. Tangren's brother could live in the house and the lodge could be used as part of a
dude ranch (Tr. Vol. 1, 22:1-13). Accordingly, in the early eighties, a building with a
basement that had been blasted out of the rock was constructed. The basement had three
bedrooms, three bathrooms, a large "rumpus" room and storage room. The level above the
basement was left open for the lodge and had two half-baths and a kitchen (Tr. Vol. 1,
22:12-20; 23:3-14; Exhibits 1, 2 and 3). Over time, holes were blasted in rock creating 15*
x 30* holes that could be used as sleeping rooms for the dude ranch (Tr. Vol. 1,25:6 to 26:2;
Exhibits 4, 5, 6, and 7). The Tagren family then built another enclave by blasting three
tunnels into the rock that were 15f wide and were 65' deep. The tunnels were then connected
by removing the rock between them (Tr. Vol. 1,26:2-25). The area was used to store tools,
vehicles and other items for the ranch (Tr. Vol. 1, 27:1-9).
Other improvements included a double horseshoe pit (Tr. Vol. 1,28:16-18), a tennis
5

court (Tr. Vol. 1,30:2 -10; Exhibit 10), baseball diamond court (Tr. Vol. 1,39:11 -20; Exhibit
15), shooting range (Tr. Vol. 1,40:2-12; Exhibit 16), an airplane runway (Tr. Vol. 1,41:1125; Exhibit 17), corral and storage areas (Tr. Vol. 1,43:18-23; Exhibit 18), and a water tank
(Tr.Vol. 1,44:1-22).
Ed Tangren, the Plaintiffs brother testified that he participated in work on the ranch
on holidays and vacations from his regular job at Geneva Steel. He testified that as of 1986
or 1988, people could live in the house at the ranch. He testified that it had a fridge,
dishwasher, cooking facilities, furniture, drapes, carpet, plumbing and 12 volt electricity.
However, Mr. Tangren acknowledged that he did not know if the place complied with the
various building codes and government regulations that were applicable to facilities offered
for rent to the general public (Ti. Vol. 2, 64:22 to 70:5).
The obvious impediments to actual operation of the ranch, as opposed to use as a
campground, included the lack of running water, electricity and the Jack of facilities to cook
and feed guests (Tr. Vol. 1, 188:11-15; Tr. Vol. 2,27:1 to29:l 7 ). The water issue was later
resolved by the reworking of the system by the Defendant to provide pressure (Tr. Vol. 1,
189:7 to 190:21; 233:23 to 234:22).

The power issue centered around the fact that there

was only a 200-watt generator at the premises and the Defendant did not believe that guests
would be satisfied with a 12-volt electrical system. The Defendant arranged for a larger
generator (Tr. Vol. 1,190:24 to 191:23). Amenities for the kitchen also had to be acquired
such as a suitable stove, warming trays, sinks, etc.(Tr. Vol. 1, 192:6-11; 237:7-11; Exhibit
6

53).
Although the Lease Agreement (Exhibit 23, Addendum No. 1) did not require the
Defendant to undertake or continue any commercial or other development of the land, the
trial court allowed into evidence at trial, a large amount of conflicting testimony as to what
development of the property was done by the Defendant and/or Richard Tangren and others
before, as opposed to after, the execution of the Lease Agreement in 1992.
The Defendant testified that he purchased carpet in 1991 or 1992 and tables and
chairs during 1996 to 1998. He also testified that he completed a run-up pad, purchased a
range and tiles for the walls and the floor (Tr. Vol. 1, 237:12 to 238:12; 23821 to 243:5,
Exhibits 52, 53, 54, 55, 56 and 60). The Defendant testified that he installed a wind mill on
the property at a cost of more than one thousand dollars (Tr. Vol. 1.236:2 to 237:6; Exhibit
52). The Defendant started the construction of a power building in 2000 and 2001 (Tr. Vol.
1,243:17 to 244:11; Exhibit 57) Barbecues and an eating area were also constructed in 2000
and 2001(Tr. Vol. 1, 245:5 to 246:1: Exhibit 58). A Jacuzzi area was started in 2000 (Tr.
Vol. 1,246:5-23; Exhibit 59). In addition, Rodney Tangren, the Defendant, testified that he
started the construction of for the propane tanks, worked with cement blocks, constructed
an anchor for the logs at the river and poured cement for various projects (Tr. Vol. 1, 48:19
to 50:25; 95:6 to 96:17; Exhibits 8, 22). The Defendant also investigated state codes that
were relevant to opening a commercial establishment and determined that a great deal of
further improvement was necessary to come into compliance (Tr. Vol. 1, 235:5-24). The
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general testimony was that the post 1992 improvements related to the main house, the power
building, the Jacuzzi area, the sheds and pens (Tr. Vol. 2, 23:23 to 24:9; Exhibit 62).
C.

Background and Execution of the Lease Agreement

Of all his children, Richard Tangren testified that the Defendant Rodney Tangren
was the only child that had showed a significant interest in the ranch and was the one that
spent a "lion's share" of the time at the ranch (Tr. Vol. 1,112:14 to 133:7;Tr. VoL 2, 72:1624),
Before

the execution of the lease in question, Rodney Tangren, the

Defendant/7Appellant was employed by Fencing Incorporated (owned by his father, Richard
Tangren). The testimony was that Rodney worked on the ranch on his own time and,
sometimes, worked on the ranch as part of his regular duties for the fencing company. The
Defendant was paid by the fencing company for normal work hours spent on die ranch
property (Tr. Vol. 1, 175:23 to 176:2). The detailed testimony revealed that the Defendant
worked for his father, Richard Tangren the Trustee of the Plaintiff trust, in the fencing
business, making $5.00 an hour from 1972 to 1989 ($157.00 dollars a week for twenty
years), when the Defendant testified that Richard retired. From 1989 until 1993, the
Defendant ran his own fencing company and paid his father a weekly check. In 1^93, the
Defendant found a buyer for the assets of his father's fencing company and arranged the
sale, from which he received no compensation

From 1993 to the time of the trial, the

Defendant spent two weeks a month on the ranch each month and received only the income
8

he generated from his fencing company (Tr. Vol. I, 193:9 to 195:3; 196:12-15). The
Defendant has never lived on the ranch and has always maintained his residence in Las
Vegas (Tr. Vol. 2, 103:8-13).
Richard Tangren characterized his relationship with his son, the Defendant Rodney
Tangen as of 1992, as good. Richard Tangren testified that around 1992. someone was
needed to oversee the Tangren ranch and he wanted the Defendant to take the job (Tr. Vol,
1,51:20-25). However, the Defendant, Rodney Tangren, in order to quit his work in fencing,
wanted some kind of protection against claims of his six siblings under the trust and to
protect the time and money he was investing in the land (Tr. Vol. 1, 52:1-18; Tr. Vol. 2,
73:10-15). The Defendant had in\ ested a great deal of time and effort in the ranch and used
his skills of buying and selling to advance the ranch project (Tr. Vol. 1, 1^5:25 to I97"3).
In response to the concerns of the Defendant, Richard Tangren. as the T rusiec o f the
Plaintiff trust, had an extended term lease (Exhibit 23, Addendum No. 1, a 96-year lease),
diafted by his attorneys in Las Vegas, Nevada, with no input by the Defendant (Tr. Vol. 2,
76:10-17). Richard Tangren, the Plaintiff Trustee explicitly questioned his attorne>s *bout
the need and propriety of the lease as drawn, but after consultation with them, decided the
lease agreement, as drawn, was the appropriate method to use to frame the transaction with
the Defendant (Tr. Vol. 1, 52:20 to 53:5; 114:19-24; Exhibit 23).
In fact, Richard Tangren admitted that he told his attorneys what to put in the lease
document and entered into the lease voluntarily (Tr Vol 1, 114:25 to 115:3; (Tr. Vol. 2,
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76:10 to 77.4; Exhibit 64). Plaintiff acknowledged that the reason the terms were so liberal
as far as terms and amounts due was because Rodney, the Defendant, was his son (Tr. Vol.
2, 77:13 to 78:8). Plaintiff acknowledged that the lawyers told him not to extend the terms
for ninety-nine years and yet, he personally wrote the term into the lease agreement. Further,
the lawyer advised him against the reduced amount of the payment in the lease and he
disregarded the advice and inserted the amount of payment in the document (Tr. Vol. 2, 85:4
to 87:15; Exhibit 23; Addendum No. 1).
Richard Tangren's testimony was vague and contradictory regarding the execution
of the lease1 in 1992 and the changes that occurred to the lease in 1994. Although the
Defendant's wife, Paula Tangren, v\ as one of the lessees on the 1992 lease (Richard Tangren
filled in the names on the lease), Richard testified that he unilaterally, at some poini in time^
after the lease was executed, removed her name from the line that preceded the Defendant's
name, for what he termed "personal reasons."

Richard's memory of events was

contradictory and unclear as to why the attorney placed "husband and wife" on the lease and
who was at the signing and how Mrs. Tangren's name was erased and e\en the date it was
executed (Tr. Vol, 1,97:13 to 103:25; 110: J-9; 114:25 to 116:3; Exhibit23; Addendum No.

1).
Richard testified that he turned down other offers to lease the property in deference
to the lease arrangement with the Defendant (Tr. Vol. 1, 60:22 to 61:4; 71:14 to 73:11).
Richard Tangren was clear that although both he and the Defendant signed the lease
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agreement, Richard Tangren retained the only copy and purposefully did not give a copy to
the Defendant (Tr. Vol. 1, 55:12-18; Exhibit 23).
Richard Tangren testified initially, that the lease agreement, Exhibit 23, was prepared
in 1992 but was not executed until 1994 (the date written in on the lease), because it was
1994 when the Defendant Rodney Tangren quit his employment with the fencing company
and went to work on the ranch (Tr. Vol. 1, 55:22 to 57:22; Exhibits 23 and 64). However,
Richard could not explain the clear alteration of 1992 to 1994 on the first paragraph of the
lease and the phrase, "the term of this lease shall commence on March 1, 1992'* that is
contained on page 2 of the lease, paragraph three (Tr. Vol. 1,116:4-14; Exhibit 23). Richard
Tangren initially denied that the lease was executed in 1992 and that he changed the lease
hiraselfii) 1994-and deleted the Defendant's wife from it (Ir. Vol. 1,116:15-25; Exhibit 23).
Later in the trial, after hearing the Defendant testify, Richard acknowledged that the lease
was signed initially in 1992 (Tr. Vol. 2, 74:21-23), He also admitted that the Defendant's
wife was on the lease initially and then taken off when the lease was re-executed in 1994 (Tr.
Vol. 2, 74:24 to 76:9).
Richard Tangren testified that he told the Defendant at the time the lease was signed
that the document was a "stop-gap measure"and, that in fact, it was not a lease. Later, the
Plaintiff testified that he simply told the Defendant that the lease would prevent his brothers
and sisters from ever coming in and forcing him from the ranch. He further stated that it was
to be used by the people running his estate when he died (Tr. Vol. 1, 104:13-25; 105:8 to
11

106:12; Tr. Vol. 2, 80.2-24; to 83:6-17). The Plaintiff could not explain at trial, how an
invalid lease, as he contended it was, would serve the interests of protecting the Defendant
(Tr. Vol. 2, 74:4-20). Later, the Plaintiff testified that he intended the lease to last ninetynine years (Tr. Vol. 1,129:1 to 18). John Tangren, another son of the Plaintiff, testified that
it was his understanding that the lease would not be relevant until his dad died (Tr. Vol. 1,
177:20 to 179:2V
The Defendant testified that the lease was prepared to protect his time and effort on
the ranch from his siblings and to protect his investment of time and effort. The Defendant
testified that the parties intended the lease as drawn and executed (Tr. Vol. 2, 19:20 to
20:22). Further, the Defendant testified that the original lease was signed and notarized in
19^2 and then in 1994, it w as changed by Richard Tangren, his father, by taking the wife of
the Defendant's name off of it and having it resigned by the Defendant and his father,
Richard Tangren, as Trustee of the family trust and re-notarized (Tr. Vol. 2. 21:1 to 2 3:11;
56:9 to 61:15, Exhibit 61). The Defendant's wife, Paula Tangren, also testified that she
signed a base in 1992 that was identical to the 1994 version, entered in evidence, with the
exception of the changed dates (1992 to 1994) and the crossmg-out of husband and wife and
the omission of her name (Tr. Vol. 2, 98:20 to 99: ] 5). Paula testified that m 1994, when the
new lease was signed, the Defendant took the old lease out of his safe and went to meet with
Richard Tangren, his father and Trustee. When the Defendant came back with the new lease,
the modifications outlined above had been made to the document (Tr. Vol 2, 99:16 to
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100:14; Exhibit 23, Addendum No 1).
The Defendant testified that he wanted to see the ranch completed before his death.
However, the Defendant learned early on that 1o have commercial guests, a great deal of
work, that he and his father, Richard had not contemplated had to be done. Richard had
wanted to give guests a bottle of water, a 12-volt light and a Snickers bar. Defendant learned
that the rules affecting a commercial "dude ranch" required much more. Although the
Defendant had cards and T-shirts made for Tangrila or Caveman Ranch (as it was
subsequently known), and had set up an office, the development was hampered by the lack
of money (Tr. Vol. 2, 102:19 to 103:7; 121:10 to 123:1). The only option available to the
Defendant included taking on partners but the change in the relationship with his father and
the litigation required the Defendant to delay until the litigation was resolved (Tt. Vol. 2,
35:18 to 37:1).
The lease was recorded by the Defendant with the San Juan County Recordei on July
19, 2001 (Exhibit 23). The Defendant testified that the lease was not recorded earlier
because the relationship between ihc Plaintiff and Defendant w as good and that Richard had
said that he didn't need to record it, In 2001, Richard had failed to timely pay the Defendant
his share of the pension plan from the tencing company of $43,000, failed to honor an
agreement on property which the Defendant felt he had a buy-sell agreement on and was
doiug a lot of things that "were not veiy good in Las Vegas.' The Defendant, acting upon
the advice of legal counsel that he sought to reco\ er his pension monies, recorded the Lease
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Agreement fir. Vol. 2, 17:19 to 19:11; Exhibit 23; Addendum No. 1).
D.

The Lease Agreement

Although the factual scenario surrounding the execution of the lease was the subject
of conflicting testimony, the Lease Agreement (Exhibit 23, Addendum No. 1) was entered
into evidence without an objection.
The lease provides the Defendant with the use of the property from February 24,1994
until February 28. 2090 (Exhibit 23. Addendum No. 1. Paragraph 3). The lease requires the
Defendant to pa> all expenses associated with maintaining the property and utility expenses
(Exhibit 23y Paragraphs 1 and 8 j. The Defendant was to comply wjth all governmental laws
and regulations with regard to che possession, use and occupancy of the property (Exhibit
23, Paragraph 2).
The Lease Agreement provided for the payment of a monthly rental of $ 1 S \ plus
taxes and insurance (Exhibit 23, Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7).
The Lease Agreement imposed absolutely no duties of any kind on the Defendant for
fiirther development of the property, new construction, or for continued investment therein
(Exhibit 23; Addendum No. I).
E.

Events After the Execution of the Lease Agreement

As indicated above, after the execution of the lease, Richard Tangren sold his
emainmg interest in the fencing company to an individual arranged for by the Defendant
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(Tr. Vol. 1, 55:22 to 57:22; Exhibit 23). From 1994 to 2001, Richard Tangren testified that
he continued to work on the ranch and pay for building and projects thereon and testified that
he did not present Rodney, the Defendant, with bills for the improvements or his labor (Tr.
Vol. 1, 58:8-14; 63:17 to 65:3; 108:3-11). John Tangren said his father, Richard, was the
driving force on the ranch (Tr. Vol. 1,179:3-6). Because of the informality of the father-son
relationship, Richard testified that he felt he could come and go as he wranted ( l r . Vol. 1,
123:18 to 124:12) During the last couple of years, Richard testified that he had not spent
"considerable 5 ' time on the ranch (Tr. Vol. 1, 85:23-25). In fact Richard could not remember
when the Defendant replaced the Plaintiffs things with his own furniture (Tr. Vol. 1. 93:13
to 94:1). Richard only knew that he would spend time on the ranch when he was w orking
there (Tr. Vol. 1. 94:7-13). Later Richard testified that he spent the same amount of time or
more time on the ranch after the lease was executed (Tr. Vol 1, 58:8-14; 106:13 to 108.5).
In aid of the contention that Richard had damaged personal property after the
animosity started, the Defendant called Johnny Starkebaum Jr. He testified that he wit* the
caretaker, hired by the Defendant on the property from October 23, 2000 to the time of trial
and was basically on the property twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. He testified
that he saw Richard Tangren on the property. He saw Richard damage a few of the trees and
he observ ed damage to the hydraulic lines on the backhoe afiler Richard had been down with
his cousin. Mr. Starkebaum implicated Richard in the damage to the dump truck, disruption
Ojra buried fuel tank, spilling of fuel and damage to foliage, pulling of a large I-beam across
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the runway and the taking of the Defendant's horse conal panels and rebar (Tr. Vol. 2,
• 139:10 to 155:24; Exhibits 39, 40, 70 and 71).
The Defendant testified that Richard had interfered with the lease and improperly
interrupted his use of the property described in the lease by building sheds, moving junk to
the ranch, removing water tanks, taking a cutoff saw, damaging aircraft wind sock, and,
taking a compressor and trailers. The Defendant testified that Richard engaged in the
misconduct described by Mr. Starkebaum. (Tr. Vol. 2, 171:3 to 184:6; 188:13 to 198:25;
Exhibits 73, 74, 75, 7, 77 and 78 ). Richard Tangren was recalled to deny any misconduct
(Tr. Vol. 2, 216:11 to 232:16)
The Defendant testified that he invested money in the ranch from bis buying and
selling of water tanks, selling of furs, buying and selling of automobiles and from his wife's
salary of $25,000 to $30,000 a year (Tr. Vol. 1. 197:19 to 200:9). Although the Defendant
and his wife made approximately fifty to sixty thousand a year for 1989 to 1991, his reported
income went down to ten thousand a year during 1992 and 1993. From 1993 to the present,
the reported income remained relatively low, approximating SI 69,000 for the last ten years
($16,900 average a year) which prevented further development of the ranch (Tr. Vol. 1,
201:1 to 205:8). During the penod from 1993 to the time of trial, the Defendant spent over
$393,000 on the ranch that was accumulated from actual wages and from the proceeds of
trading and other side ventures including crafts that the Defendant's wife managed (Tr. Vol.
2, 105:3 to 118:12; 167:19 to 171:2; Exhibit 66). Richard Tangren contended that the
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accounting for the expenses was invalid and included the Defendant's personal items (Tr.
V o l . 2 , 125:1 to 134:13).
Richard Tangren testified that on or about June 13, 1995, he delivered a letter to the
Defendant at the fencing company, Exhibit 25. notifying the Defendant that he was
cancelling all written and oral agreements with the Defendant because of the Defendant's
breach of the agreements (Tr. Vol 1, 62:5 to 63:11). However, the Plaintiff could not
confirm that the Defendant was still working at the fencing company in 1995, the location
he claimed to ha\e delivered the letter (Tr. Vol. 1, 119:4 to 120:21: Exhibit 25). Richard
acknowledged that the notice, Exhibit 75, does not list who the Plaintiff is cancelling the
agreements with. Further, the document does not even use the word "default" or language
that provided a time to cure the alleged deficiencies (Tr. Vol. 1, 120:22 to 121*21; Exhibit
25). Further, as to items two through six on Exhibit 25 which the Plaintiff contended were
breaches of the Lease Agreement, none of the alleged failures described therein were ; terns
that were required to be done under the terms of the lease (Tr. Vol. L 121:22 to 122:2;
Exhibits 23 and 25;.
John Tangren, another son of the Plaintiff and older brother of the Defendant testified
that he and the Defendant co-managed the fencing company in Las Vegas and that the
Defendant had worked at the fencing company since he was fourteen years of age to 19992000, although John Tangren testified that he lefi the fencing company to go out on his own
m 1987 (Jr. Vol. 1, 173:22 to 175:3). On cross examination, Mr. Tangren admitted that he
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had no information to dispute that the Defendant left the fencing company in 1993 (Tr. Vol.
1, 182:18 to 183:1).
Richard Tangren testified that in 2001, there was a change in the relationship between
him and his son, the Defendant, Rodney Tangren. Contrary to his earlier testimony that it
was 1994 that Rodney Tangren left the fencing business and began working on the ranch,
he testified subsequently that it was in 2001 that the Defendant stopped working for the
fencing company and that Joe Reilly bought the Plaintiffs fencing equipment and inventory
(Richard retained owneiship of the fencing business) and that the lease agreement (Exhibit
23) was recorded with the San Juan Recorder (Tr. Vol. 1,67:6 to 68.13). It was also in 2001
that Richard Tangren testified that his son, the Defendant Rodney Tangren, told him to leave
the premises (Tr. Vol. 1, 68:25 to 69:4).
Richard testified that between 1995 and 2001, he neither demanded any rent from the
Defendantnor sent him default notices of any kind (Tr. Vol. J, 1 1 7 : r / t o 118:5). Hetestified
that he gave his son, the Defendant, the impression that he would work with him on the rent
(Tr. Vol. 1, 124:0-22; (Tr. Vol. 2,78:19-21). The Plaintiff acknowledged that he received
checks from the Defendant, on or about the date indicared on the instruments in the
following amounts: a check dated 11/13/2001 for $1,650 (Exhibit 27); a check for $3,300
dated 1/1/2002 (Exhibit 28); a check for $18,775 dated 3/25/2002 (Exhibit 29); a check for
$ 2 / 7 5 dated 12/30/02 (Exhibit 30); a check for $3,025 dated 1/30/02 (Exhibit 31) and other
checks (Fxhibits 32 and 33) Richard testified that he did not attempt to deposit the checks
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and accordingly received no mone\ from the checks. He testified that he did not cash the
checks or present them for payment at the bank, based upon legal advice (Tr. Vol. 1, 74:14
to 81:11; 126:18 to 127:3;Tr. Vol. 2,78:22 to 79:15). There was testimony that some of the
checks, if they would have been deposited by the Plaintiff, would not have cleared the bank.
However, there were accounting problems between Richard and Defendant that included
money that was owed by Richard to the Defendant. Specifically, Richard delayed paying the
Defendant his portion of the profit-sharing plan from the fencing business (Tr. Vol. 2, 6:10
to 15:17; Tr. Vol. 2, 17:19 to 18:14).
The Defendant, after the lease was executed, lived in a house adjacent to the fencing
company that belonged to Richard Tangren, the Defendant's father, in Las Vegas. The
understanding was that the house would be the Defendant's if he would pay the Plaintiffs
insurance payments which ran from $300 to $600 per month. Richard recanted on that
promise (Tr. Vol. 2, 103:14 to 104 to 105:2).
The Defendant testified that he paid his father cash payments of $275 every month
(rent amount plus prorated taxes and insurance), as required by the lease, from 1992 until he
started paying by check in 2001 (Tr. Vol. 2, 6:10 to 7:5; 210:8 to 211:10). Paula, the
Defendant's wife witnessed the cash payments from 1992 to 2001 and testified that she
wanted to pay by check but that Richard wanted cash for tax purposes. The Defendant also
testified that Richard wanted cash to avoid taxes

(Tr. Vol. 2, 100:16 co 102:18; 167:1).

When the Plaintiff contended he had not been paid, the Defendant sought legal arivice and
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was told that he had to have proof of payment but if he did pay again by check, the amounts
he had previously paid, he could seek recovery of the amounts in courl. Accordingly, the
Defendant prepared and tendered the check for $18,775 dated 3/25/2002 (Exhibit 29)(Tr„
Vol. 2, 7:6 to 8:16). The $ 18,775 delinquent figure was arrived at from a default notice sent
by Plaintiffs attorney acknowledging that the total rent due through March, 2002 was
$23,925 having offset the tendered payments of $4,950.00 (Tr. Vol. 2, 54:18 to 55:18,
Exhibit 41).
Richard Tangren testified that he delivered the Defendant another notice dated
January 29,2002, indicating that the Defendant was in default for failure to make payments
pursuant to the lease. Later the Plaintiff testified that he mailed the notice to an address other
than that specified in the lease and sent it certified mail and the letter was returned. The
notice stated that the lease would be void and canceled unless payments were brought
current within ten days (Tr. Vol. 1, 82:1 to 83:19; Exhibit 34). Finally, the Plaintiff
acknowledged that the notice was never received by Rodney because of the use of the wrong
address (Jr. Vol. 1, 122:9 to 1234:17).
Richard testified that despite the earlier notice of default, he sent another letter to the
Defendant on March 6, 2002, after he had received three checks, wanting to talk to the
Defendant, inquiring whethei the Defendant was still interested in running the dude ranch
and acknowledging the existence of the lease (Tr. Vol. 1. 125:12 to 127:11; Fxhibit 37).
Counsel for the Plaintiff testified to Exhibit 41, a letter that was sent by him to the
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Defendant in March of 2002, that was returned by the post office (Tr. Vol. 1, 165:19 to
166:1; Exhibits 41 and 42) He also testified about a letter sent to Defendant's counsel,
Exhibits 43, 44, 45 and 46 (Tr. Vol. 1, 167:3 to 168:23). The Defendant testified that he
lived at 3223 East Charleston in Las Vegas, Nevada for 15 years and received his mail at his
post office box (Tr. Vol. 1, 186:1 to 187:13).
Richard Tangren, the Trustee of the Plaintiff trust acknowledged that the real reason
he brought the pending action was not because of the lack of rent payments but because of
the length of the lease (Tr. Vol. 1, 127:20 to 128:17; Tr. Vol. 2, 79:16 to 80:1).
Richard Tangren also gave testimony that the Defendant had not properly maintained
the premises in that he took the blinds down in the rooms (allegedly causing sun damage to
the carpets), removed a water wheel and tore down a "military complex" thai the Plaintiff
had built that had a 1,000 pound dummy bomb, 75 millimeter field piece and 75 millimeter
shells. The Defendant also allegedly did not repair wind damage to a shed immediately, but
did repair it. In addition, all the Richard's furniture was removed and replaced with the
Defendant's own furniture. Richaid alleged that some pipe that was on a trailer was
removed as well as logs in the jetty, although the logs were recovered by him (Tx. Vol. 1,
88:2 to 90:3). However. Richard Tangren acknowledged that removing property was not in
contravention of any clause in the lease (Tr. Vol. 1,132:1-7). Further, Richard admitted that
the pipe was not taken or hidden or misused (Tr. Vol. 1, 132:16 to 135:5). As to personal
property claims. Richard acknowledged that he had no evidence that the Defendant took his
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gun, silver collection or the tractor. He further acknowledged that he openly advertised for
people to come to the ranch by plane or boat to look at the place, without supervision,
leaving the premises open to vandalism and theft (Tr Vol. 1, 135.10 to 139:24. 139:25 to
140:14).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Lease Agreement executed by the parties (Exhibit 23, Addendum No. 1), has all
the necessary components in the document to be a valid, binding and enforceable contract.
Hie Lease Agreement was a fully integrated and unambiguous contract and
accordingly parol evidence was not admissible with regard to the same. The Lease
Agreement, as drafted, enjoyed a presumption of "integration" that was not found b> the trial
court to be overcome by the evidence. The Plaintiff, who drafted the Lease Agreement,
filled in the critical blanks detailing the parties, term and rent and then signed the Lease
Agreement not once but twice, separated by two years. The I ease Agreement was drafted
to include an "integration" clause and based upon the clear language of the

Lease

Agreement and the circumstances sunounding its drafting and execution, the trial court
should have found the same to be fully integrated and unambiguous and excluded parol
evidence relating thereto.
The trial court violated established rules of contract interpretation in finding that the
Lease Agreement was invalid. The trial court properly allowed the introduction of parol
evidence to examine whether the Lease Agreement was fully integrated. In allowing that
22

testimony, the trial court allowed Richard Tangren, who exclusively, with the aid of his
lawyers, drafted the subject lease, to testify of an "intent" with regard thereto that was
contradictory to the intent clearly and unequivocally set out m writing in the Lease
Agreement. The Lease Agreement clearly gave the Defendant an exclusive right to occupy
the described real property, as against all other persons, for the term of the lease. Richard
Tangren testified that it was his intent only to allow a defense for the Defendant to claims
for the right to use the real property raised by his six siblings. The intent testified to by
Richard Tangren is clearly contrary to the terms of the Lease Agreement. The trial court in
adopting that "intent" as a basis for invalidating the ledse violated the clear maxim that even
with partially integrated contracts, the parol evidence may not vary, modify or contradict the
written terms of the contract.
Further, the ruling of the court does not make practical sense. If the court could have
rightfully concluded that the intent of the parties was to limit the lease to excluding the
Defendant's siblings from access to the ranch, that would have been cause to rule that the
Lease Agreement did not reach or relate to the right of Richard Tangren to access the ranch
but certainly would not be a basis for invalidating the lease in its entirety. The trial court's
use of the statements of the parties before and after the Lease Agreement was executed to
alter the terms thereof has no basis in the law relating to the interpretation of contracts.
The Findings of the trial court are clearly inadequate to support the determination that
the lease was invalid.
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Finally, the Court, by declaring the lease void, thereby erroneously denied the
Defendant relief under the Counterclaim for the enforcement of the Lease Agreement.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE LEASE AGREEMENT IS A VALID AND BINDING
LEASE ENTITLING THE DEFENDANT TO ENFORCEMENT THEREOF.

A.

The Lease Agreement is, as Required, in Writing and Contains the
Essential Elements of a Contract

The Lease Agreement in this case is in compliance with the Statute of Frauds in that
it is in writing, "subscribed by the party by whom the lease . . . is to be made, or by his
lawful agent ihereunto authorized in writing''

Utah Code Annotated 25-5-3- (1953 as

Amended).
Secondly, the Lease Agreement contains all the essential elements of an enforceable
lease and contract.
[T]he essential parts of a lease to establish validity under the statute of frauds
are (1) the identity of the property, (2) ihe agreed term, i.e., time period, and
(3) the rental amount (rate) and time and manner of payment.
English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Birdzellv Utah
OilRefinmgCo., 121 Utah412,242P.2d578,580(1952)(citingCollettv. Goodrich, 119Utah662,
231 P.2d 730 (1951) and Hawaiian Equipment Co. v. Eimco Corp., 115 Utah 590, 207 P.2d 794
(1949)).
Even a cursory examination of the Lease Agreement introduced in 1his case reveals
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that the three essential elements are all explicitly detailed within the terms of the lease in
question.
The Lease Agreement (Exhibit 23, Addendum No. 1) is a clear and easily understood
contract. It allows the Defendant to occupy exclusively, as a lessee, the real property,
comprising the Tangren ranch, also known as Tangrila or the Caveman Ranch. The real
property included in the lease is clearly described by legal description (Exhibit 23,
Addendum No. 1, Exhibit "A" thereto).
The Lease Agreement imposes absolutely no duty of any kind or nature on the
Defendant to build, construct

or develop the real property described in the Lease

Agreement. The Lease Agreement requires that the Defendant, as Lessee, accept the real
property "as is" and then simply requires him to pay the expenses cf "maintaining" the
property which includes repair and maintenance of utilities as described in Paragraph 1
thereof.
The Lease Agreement is for a term commencing February 24, 1994 and ending
February 28, 2090 (96 years) (Exhibit 23, Addendum No. 1, Paragraph 3 and Preamble).
The Lease Agreement provides for the payment of rent, taxes, utilities and insurance
and the increase of the same over the term of the Lease Agreement (Exhibit 23, Addendum
No. 1, Paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8).
The Lease Agreement contains stock provisions relating to compliance with
applicable laws and ordinances (Paragraph 2); possession (Paragraph 4); events of default,
termination, right to cure (Paragraphs 9, 10 and 11); assignment (Paragraphs 12 and 13);
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governing law (Paragraph 14); notice (Paragraphs 15, 19 and 20); and attorney fees
(Paragraph 21).
Importantly, the Lease Agreement contains Paragraph lo, entitled "no other
assurances" which states:
Lessee makes this Lease in reliance upon its provisions, including any
amendments, supplements and extensions, and not in reliance upon any
alleged assurances, representations and warranties made by the Lessor, or
Lessor's agents, servants or employees. (Emphasis added)
The Lease contains, in Paragraph 17, a provision that acknowledges that the lease ,f.
.. contains the entire understanding between the parties with respect to its subject matter, the
Property and all aspects of the relationship between Lessee and Lessor." (Emphasis added)
Paragraph 18 continues by requiring that all amendments to the Lease Agreement be in
writing.
The Appellant respectfully submits that the Lease Agreement is complete and
contains, in clear language, all the essential elements of a lease.
B.

The Lease Agreement is Fully Integrated and Unambiguous and
Therefore the Terms Thereof Should not have Been Modified,
Enlarged or Varied b> Parol Evidence.

The parol evidence rule "operates in the absence of fraud to exclude [prior and]
contemporaneous conversations, statements, or representations offered for the purpose cf
varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract." Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d
663, 665 (Utah 1985) (emphasis omitted). "An agreement is integrated where the parties
thereto adopt a writing or writings as the final and complete expression of the agreement/'
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Eie v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 63 8 P.2d 1190,1194 (Utah 1981) (quotations and citation omitted).
The parol evidence rule, as applied to integrated contracts, is a substantive rule of
contract construction, rather than a rule of evidence See 6 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on
Contracts § 573 at 72 (interim ed.2002). Parol evidence is not so much inadmissible to vary
the terms of an integrated writing as it is irrelevant, because "the later agreement discharges
the antecedent ones in so far as it contradicts or is inconsistent with the earlier ones." Id. at
82.
The task for the trial court is to " . . . first determine whether the writing was intended
by the parties to be an integration. In resolving the preliminary question of fact, parol
evidence, indeed any relevant evidence, is admissible." ef Smith v. DA. Osguthorpe, 58 P.3d
854 (Utah App. 2002). However, to preserve the integrity of written contracts, Utah courts
apply "a rebuttable presumption that a writing which on its tace appears to be an integrated
agreement is what it appears to be." /^.(citations omitted); see also Terry's Sales. Inc. v.
Vander Veur II, 618 P.2d 29, 32 (Utah 1980) ("Where parties have various claims and
obligations to each other, and have had a discussion about resolving their disputes which
results in a written agreement signed by them, it is generally to be assumed that their
disputes were merged into the written agreement."). Further, the coun is to assume that a
writing dealing with the same subject was intended by the parties to supercede any prior or
contemporaneous agreements. See id.\ see aiso Smith, 58 p.3d 854.
As it relates to the question of ambiguity, us determine on is a question of law which
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is reviewed for correctness." Oliphant v Estate ufBnmetti, 64 P.3d 587 (Utah A pp. ,2002 j.
The law is that "[cjontract language may be ambiguous if it is unclear, omits terms, or if the
terms used to express the intention of the parties may be understood to have two or more
plausible meanings/' Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm Fire & Car, Co.. 790 P.2d 581,
583 (Utah CtApp.1990) (citation omitted). Absent ambiguity, interpretation of a contract
presents a question of law rather than a question of fact, and it i>> undertaken without resort
to extrinsic evidence of the parties' intentions. See Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716
(Utah 1985); Seashores Inc. v. Harneyt 738 P.2d 645, 647 (Utah Ct.App.1987). Only "[i]f
a contract is ambiguous [may] extrinsic evidence ... be introduced to clarify the parties'
intent." Id.
The Findings of Fact and Order entered in this matter (Addendum, No.2), do not
contain a single reference to an ambiguity. The Plaintiff did not maintain, as its position in
the matter, that any provision in the Lease Agreement was ambiguous. The trial court did
not use the existence of an ambiguity, as a icason for invalidating the Lease Agreement.
Accordingly patent or latent ambiguities cannot provide a juMifIcat:on for invalidating tin
Lease Agreement.
As it relates to integration, the Findings of Fact and Order neither acknowledges nor
discusses, the presumption of integration that attaches to a contract that contains, as the
Lease Agreement in this case provides, an integration clause (Exhibit 23, Addendum No. 1
at Paragraph 1 7). Under the rule, "an apparently complete and certain agreement whicn the
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parties have reduced to writing will be conclusively presumed to contain the whole
agreement." Eic v. Sf. Benedicts Hasp., 638 P.2d 1190, 1192 (Utah 1981)); see also
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 213-14 (1981). The Findings and Order neither
recites nor discusses the presumption of integration that a writing dealing with the same
subject is presumed to have been intended by the parties to supercede any prior or
contemporaneous agreements. Without a finding that the presumptions do not apply or are
overcome by an adequate showing of evidence, there was not a legal basis for the trial court
to conclude that the Lease Agieement was not fully integrated.
There is no dispute that the Plaintiff had the Lease Agreement drafted by its counsel.
Further, the Trustee of the Plaintiff trust dictated the terms thereof. Richard Fangren
discussed extensively the implications of the Lease Agreement with the same counsel and
then offered the lease to the Defendant for execution after disregarding counsel's advice.
The evidence is no; in dispute that it was the Plaintiffs agent, Richard Tangren, who
personally filled in and then two years later modified the Lease Agreement

It was ^he

Plaintiff that unilaterally determined the identity of the Lessee, the rental rate and term of the
Agreement. Then incredibly, it was the Plaintiff, without solicitation by the Defendant that
orchestrated the signing of that Lease Agreement not once, but nvice, separated by a two
year period in which the Plaintiff had to reconsider the implications of the contract. There
is no legal question that the Lease Agreement is a complete and integrated contract.
C.

The Basis Upon Which the Trial Court In validate i the Lease
Agreement is Clear!} Contrary io Utah Law.
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Although the reasoning process of the tiial court m declaring the Lease Agreement
invalid is not clear, the presumed basis used b> the trial court is clearly contrary to basic
principles of contract interpretation The relevant provisions of the Findings of Fact ard
Order (Addendum No. 2) which demonstrate the trial court's thought process are as follows:
9.
The Court finds that the lease was prepared at the behest of Richard
Tangren, that he had advice of counsel with tegard to its terms and went
against the advice of counsel The Court finds that his action^ againsl the
counsel of his attorneys in the execution and content of the lease is an
indication of his effort to make a concession to Rodney Tangren and that the
agreement would not come into effect unless there was a quarrel or dispute
with the Tangren siblings.
10.
The Court finds that based upon the foregoing, the document noted in
this litigation as the "Lease'* was intended as a protection against incursion
upon the Defendant by his siblings and was not intended to govern actions
between Richard Tangten and Rodney Tangren and both parties agreed and
understood thar ir would only take effect *f challenged by Rodne)'- siblings
11.

The Court finds that the "Lease' is nor a valid document.

12.
The Court finds that Rodney Tangren knew the "Lease" WHS n^t
intended as a functioning agreement between the Tangren Trusi and Defendant
and was intended to protect Rodney from incursions or challenges by his
siblings.
13.
The court finds that there was no reliance OP die lease document as a
valid and binding lease by Rodney Tangren
14
As the Court has found the lease to be invalid, there was no
requirement to pay rent and thereby no rent is due from Rodney Tangren to
Richard Tangren.
15.
The Court finds that Rodney Tangren knew that the agreement was not
between he and Richard, but was to protect him from his siblings and
therefore, there was no fraud which induced him or caused any damage to
Rodney.
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16.
With regard to the Defendant1 s unjust enrichment claim, the Court does
not find sufficient evidence to show that he improved the property. The value
or evidence on expenditures was just tc maintain the property and did not
increase the value of the property.
Findings of Fact and Order, Addendum No, 2.
Initially, the decision makes no sense. If the trial court found that the Lease
Agreement was intended to provide the Defendant with protection from the claims of his six
siblings for the right to use the ranch property for the term of the lease, why did the trial
court invalidate the entire lease as opposed to finding only that the lease was valid as to the
siblings attempt to use the ranch property, but did not reacii or control dealings between the
Defendant and Richard Tangren personally. The fact thai the trial court found that the intent
of the document was limited, was not a legal basis to invalidate the lease in toto, especially
when the trial court found a meeting of the minds between Richard Tangren and the
Defendant on the intent to protect the Defendant against his siblings.
The clear error of the trial court is, however, more fundamental and basic. The trial
court properly received parol and extrinsic evidence relating to the circumstances
surrounding the negotiation, execution and performance of ti»e Lease Agreement to ev aluate
integration. The trial court then focused on testimony from Richard Tangren that his intent
in negotiating, preparing and executing the lease was not what was expressed in the Lease
Agreement he had drafted, but was something entirely contradictory. The trial court then
improperly concluded that it could adopt as the real intent of the panics, the ''intent'"
expressed by Richard Tangren, which was totally contradictory to that staled in the clear
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written terms of the Lease Agreement.
What the trial court did. waj to allow a party wno had complete control over the
drafting and execution of the lease to prevail in his attempt to invalidate the lease, based on
oral testimony that his intent in signing tne lease was something other than expressed in the
clear written language of the contract he drafted. Certainly there is no way to reconcile the
lease language that gives the Defendant the right to exclusively occupy, as against all
persons, the ranch for % years without any obligation to develop, build or impiove the
property (Exhibit 23, Addendum No 1), with the Plaintiffs contention that the lease was
only intended to protect against claims of siblings and did not grant a right to occupy as
against anyone else. Certainly; the intent to protect only against the siblings and his intent
that the Defendant continue to develop the property is also clearly in conflict with the written
language contained in the lease.
The use of parol evidence, even if it established that the contract is only partially
integrated, to vary, alter or modify the written terms of the contract, is clearly forbidden by
Utah law. Novell, Inc. v. Canopy Group, Inc., 92 P.3d 768 (Utah App..?.004).
The cases establish that a showing that the parties did not include all the terms of
their agreement in the writing does not render the writing uiiintegrated with respect to the
terms it docs include, because contracts may be partially integrated:
[P jarol evidence nor inconsistent with the writing is admissible to show what
the entire contract really was, by supplementing, as distinguished from
contradicting, ihe writing. In such a case parol evidence to prove the pan not
reduced to wilting is admissible, although it is not admissible as to the part
reduced to writing.
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Webb v R O.A Gen.. Inc. 804 P.2d 54 7, 551 (Ltah Ct App.1991) ''emphasis in origiriaH
(quoting Stanger \. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1933)).
Accordingly, where a binding agreement exists, whether completely or partially
integrated, evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements or discussions is not admissible
to contradict terms of the written agreement/' A/, (emphasis added"!: see also State Bank of
Lehi v Woolsey, 565 P.2d 413,418 (Utah 1977)(stating "parol evidence of contemporaneous
conversations, representations or statements will not be received for the purpose of varying
or adding to the terms of [he written agreement11).
The position of the Utah courts is consistent with basic principles of contract
interpretation adopted by other states and as noted by the secondary sources As noted b>
one court, when even a partially integrated contract is at issue, a court may not admit
extrinsic evidence that contradicts or varies the terms of the contract. Rather, admissible
extrircic evidence is limited to additional contractual tcims that are consistent with the
written lerrns of the partially integrated contract. TRIM) V4 Corp. v. Pilkington Bros P L (".,
638 N.E.2d 572. (Ohio, ]994). See, also, 11 Williston on Contracts supra, at 659, Section
33:20 ("[I]f a contract is not fully integrated, parol evidence of additional contract terms may
be admiited to complete the agreement, bu t only to the extent that tne additional terms GO not
contradict the written terms of the agreement."). Thus, unlike a fully integrated contract,
which cannot be contradicted or supplemented by extnnsic evidence, a panially integrated
contract can be supplemented, but not contradicted, by extrinsic evidence. Id
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POINT II: THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER ARE INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT THE DETERMINATION THAT THE LE4SE
AGREEMENT WAS INVALID.
The case law in Utah mandates that the factual findings entered by the tnal court
must be sufficiently detailed to allow the reviewing court the information necessary to
review the trial court's decision. State v James, 858 P.2d 1012, 1015 (Utah 1993). Utah
R.Civ.P. 52(a) requires that the trial court specify its findings on the record where resolution
of factual issues is necessary in determining a motion State v Marshall, 791 p.2d 8 SO, 882
(Utah App. 1990), ce^. demed, 800P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). In relevant part the Rule State:
(a) Effect. Iv all actions tried upon the facts without a jury oi witn an advisory
jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions
of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 53A. . .
Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. . . .
As noted by the Court in Jensen v Jensen, n15 P.2d 436 (Utah Ct. App. 1989),
adequate findings are those that (1) are sufficient^ detailed, \2) include enough f&.v to
disclose Lne process through which the ultimate Lonciusion is leached. (3) indicate the
processes logical and properly supported, and (4) ate not clearly erroneous. It is clear that
the failure of the trial court to make findings on all material issues is reversible error.
Epstein v. llpvein, 741 P.2d 974 (Utah O. App. lc>87). As noted by the Com* In Parks v
Zions First National Bank, 6 7 3 P.2d 590 (Utah ! 983), the findings must clearly indicate the
"mind of the court", and the failure to enter adequate findings require- the judgment be
vacated.
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A review of the Findings of Fact and Order (Addendum No. 2, R 127-134) reveals
that the Findings are inadequate and require, on that basis alone, reversal for a new u ial The
F hidings do not detail the process by which the trial court interpreted the Lease Agreement
in question.
As outlined above, the trial court first had a duty of determining if the lease met the
basic requirements of an enforceable contract. The trial court then had a duty to examine the
facts and circumstances relating co the lease and determine if the lease was fully or partially
integrated and whether there were claims of ambiguity or fraud. The findings cio not detail
any such process by the court.
The trial court was required to deal with the presumptions that are crested in this case
that the Lease Agreement is fully integrated. Those presumptions arise Hi si, from the
^integration" clause contained in the Lease Agreement. Second, a presumption is created
when an apparently complete and certain agreement wlvch the parties have reduced (o
writing is presented to the court. That conclusive presumption is that the agreement will be
conclusively presumed to contain the whole agreement. Third, a writing dealing with the
same subject is presumed to have been intended by the parties to supercede any prior or
contemporaneous agreements.
The trial court did not acknowledge the presumption and did not enter any findings
that the presumptions were overcome by the required quantum of evidence.
After a determination of whether the agreement is partially or fully integrated, there
has to be a determination as to whether the parol evidence that was allowed to be considered
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on the question of integration, was also being accepted by the court for purposes of
augmenting the terms of the written Lease Agreement. Again the findings in this case are
silent.
In this case, clearly the trial court admitted the extrinsic testimony relating to Mr.
Richard Tangren's "intent" behind the preparation and execution of the lease. The court, in
order to comply with the accepted laws of contract interpretation, had to find that rhe intent,
testified by Mr. Tangren, did not conflict with the intent outlined in the written agreement.
Again the findings are silent.
The rrial court was required to link its finding that the intent of the lease was to
provide a defense available to the Defendant to resist an assened right to use the ranch by
his siblings, with a determination that the entire lease had to be invalidated, nstead of
holding that the lease did not apply to the Trustee of the Plaintiff trust foi some reasoi-i but
was valid for purposes of the beneficiaries under the Trust, the Court invalidated the entire
agicement. Again, there was no link between the finding and the ultimate holding in rhe
case.
Based upon the clear lack of necessary findings to join the various tangents ruled
upon by the trial court to a finding of invalidity of the Lease Agreement, the Order of the
trial court should be reversed.
POINT ill: THE ERRONEOUS RULING INVALIDATING THE LEASE
AGREEMENT IMPROPERLY DENIED THE DEFENDANT
RELIEF UNDER THE COUNTERCLAIM
The ruling of the trial court invalidating the Lease Agreement, obviously deprived the
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Defendant of relief under the terms of the Counterclaim, because a finding that the Lease
Agreement is a valid and enforceable contract, would allow the Defendant to address issues
raised in his Counterclaim that were contingent on the validity of the lease. Inasmuch as the
Defendant has now been denied the benefits of the Lease Agreement through the appeal
process, it is respectfully submitted that the only appropriate remedy is a reversal of the trial
court's findings and a remand for a new trial with instructions consistent with contract
interpretation as addressed herein.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court committed reversible error in
invalidating the Lease Agreement executed by the parties and in formulating the findings of
fact submitted as a basis for the court's order.
Based thereon, Defendant respectfully requests that the Findings of Fact and Order
be reversed and that the matter be remanded to the district court for a new trial with
instructions consistent with the law set out herein.
Dated this/_?day of March, 2006.

t^—.

Matthew P. Jube, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that oL copies of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following, on the / 7 day of March, 2006.
CRAIG C. HALLS, ESQ.
333 South Main Street
Blanding, Utah 84551
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Exhibit "1"
Lease Agreement

Feei
32.00 Check
LOUISE C JONES, Recorder
F i l e d By LCJ
For RODNEY TANGREN
SON JUAN COUNTY CORPORATION
LEASE AGREEMENT

by an^between^ \\lcMfrr<i^.

19g£,

/ CU>y^r*.^
'

I

and*

w

Trustee of

(hereinafter called "Lessor")

and> /pf&ruzsf'

/ *&*7GS~QLLf', «ht»band

<H=*4-

*t4r£m- (hereinafter called "Lessee") .

W I T N E S S E T H :
That for and in consideration of the sum of One Hundred
DOLLARS

($100.00),

the

receipt

and sufficiency

of which

is

acknowledged, Lessor and Lessee hereby agree that Lessor shall
lease to Lessee, and Lessee shall lease from Lessor the real
property described hereinbelow, upon and subject to the terms,
conditions and covenants set forth herein.
1.

The Property:

Lessor hereby

leases

to Lessee and

Lessee hereby leases from Lessor, the real property including all
improvements

thereon

(hereinafter

collectively

called

the

"Property") located in San Juan County, Utah, which property is
more fully described

on Exhibit A and incorporated herein by

reference.
Lessee hereby agrees to and shall accept the Property AS IS
AND WHERE
WHATSOEVER.

IS, WITHOUT ANY WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND OR NATURE
Except

as

otherwise

expressly

provided

herein,

Lessee shall be required to pay the expenses of every kind and
nature

whatsoever

associated

^

with

maintaining

the

Property,

including, without limitation, all repairs, maintenance and the
like of every kind and nature whatsoever with respect to the
Property, heat, light, power, water, sewage, telephone and any
and all other public service and utility costs used in or on said
property during the term of this Lease or any renewal thereof,
and all other expenses which may be incurred by Lessee, from the
time

of

earlier•

possession

or

the

commencement

date,

whichever

is

It is the intention- of this paragraph to provide that

Lessor shall have no responsibility or obligation for expenses
with

respect

to

the

care

or

maintenance

of

the

Property

regardless of the nature of the expense, or the fact that the
condition resulting in the expense may have preceded the Lessee's
possession

or

the

commencement

date, whichever

is

earlier,

unless otherwise specifically provided herein.
2.

Compliance with Laws and Regulation:

Lessee shall

comply fully with all laws, regulations, males and orders of any
government or governmental agency that may apply to this Lease,
to its performance and to the possession, occupancy and use of
the Property.
3.

Duration

commence on 'TTl&uJ^

of

Lease:

The term

of this Lease

shall

/ , 199*, or upon delivery of possession,

whichever occurs first, and unless it comes to an end sooner by
operation of the provisions contained herein or by operation of
law, shall

continue for a term which shall terminate on the

occurrence of a default by Lessee or on ^4Lh

2

J2&

i 2090.

4.

Possession:

Lessor and Lessee acknowledge that Lessee

is currently in possession of the Property and shall continue in
possession hereafter pursuant to this Agreement.
5.

Rental:

Lessee shall pay to Lessor a monthly rent of
($ ,/-£"£) * O Q ) due and payable on the 1st day

of

each

calendar month

'^9lP<3>cd>7
the

same

estimated
calendar

date
annual
year.

(the "Due Date") beginning with the

rental payment.
Lessee
taxes
For

shall
and

pay

In addition each month on

one-twelfth

insurance

example

in

for

1991

the

(1/12)

the

then

estimated

of

the

current
annual

insurance cost is $ {£?Q&*£>** and the estimated cost for real
property taxes is $ yS^Q »S>Q

During calendar year 1992 each

monthly payment to Lessor will include an amount equal to the sum
of one-twelfth (1/12) of each of these estimated annual costs, or.
in 1992r the sum of $./ JL £> * °^ monthly.

Thus in 1992 each monthly

payment made to Lessor shall be $ aj %S "^monthly rent and one-twelfth

being the sum of the

(1/12) of each of the estimated

annual costs.
All payments shall be made to Lessor at
/-tjy^'iy&qc'r-r
6.

r^** .

3 //ft iz~

(^^ux^

or where subsequently directed.

Payment Increases:

Ten days prior to January 1, of

each calendar year or as soon thereafter as the estimated annual
costs for taxes and insurance can be ascertained, Lessor shall
provide to Lessee the calculated sum to be paid monthly for said
costs in addition to the $^

per month rental payment.

Upon notice Lessee shall increase or decrease the total monthly
3

payment beginning with the first payment due subsequent to the
notice.

If Lessor fails to provide such notice then the monthly

payment

shall

continue

in the

amount

paid

calendar year until such notice is provided.

in the

previous

Any special taxes

or assessment which become due during the term hereof shall be
paid by Lessee upon demand by Lessor.
7.

Taxes,

Insurance.

to

be

Paid:

Lessor

shall

be

responsible for paying out of the monthly estimated sum received
from

Lessee

pursuant

to

paragraph

5

all

real

property

tax

assessed against the Property during the term of the Lease and
the insurance.
8.
pay

Utilities;

directly

to

the

Lessee shall be responsible for and shall
suppliers

all

charges

for

electricity,

sewage, gas and all other utilities and services used on or in
connection with the Property during the term of this Lease and
during any period of occupancy of the Property before or after
such term.
9.

Events of Default:

In any one or more of the following

cases, or in any one or more of the cases that elsewhere in this
Lease may be made subject to this provision, Lessor shall have
just cause to do so and may declare Lessee in default if Lessee:
(a)

neglects to timely perform any of its payments or
other obligations under this Lease;

(b)

whether

voluntarily

or

involuntarily,

becomes

unable to meet its financial obligations as they
mature;
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(c)

becomes insolvent; or

(d)

vacates the property and leaves it vacant for a
period

in

excess

of

thirty

days

without

prior

approval from Lessor*

10.

Termination of Lease Upon Default:

default as described

In the event of a

in Section 9 above, Lessor may elect to

terminate this Lease upon ten (10) days notice to Lessee and to
demand and to receive the immediate surrender of the Property as
well as the immediate payment of all amounts then due from Lessee
to Lessor by law and under this Lease, without prejudice to all
such other rights and remedies as may exist by law under this
Lease, but reserving to Lessee the benefits of Section 11 below
in a case where they apply.
11.

L e s s e e ^ Cure of Default:

Without prejudice to the

provisions of this Lease regarding rights and remedies and the
resolution
without

of

claims,

limiting

the

controversies,
concurrent

demands

or

availability

disputes
of

all

and
such

provisions to Lessor, if Lessor seeks to terminate this Lease
upon a default in the payment of rent, taxes or other sum payable
under

this

Lease

or

upon

any

other

default

which

Lessee

reasonably and promptly can correct, Lessor shall give Lessee ten
(10) days notice to correct such default, and such notice shall
not

take

effect

at

the end

of

such

corrects the default in the interim.
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ten

(10)

days

if

Lessee

12.

Assignment

bv

Lessee:

This

Lease

is personal

to

Lesseef and Lessee does —* have the right to assign or transfer
this Lease.
13.

Assignment bv Lesso^r:

This Lease or the payments due

Lessor hereunder may be assigned.

Lessor has the right to set up

a collection account and Lessee upon notice agrees to make all
subsequent payments to such collection account as directed.
14.

Governing Lav:

The law applicable to the performance

of this Lease shall be the law of the State of Utah.
15.

Notice of Lease:

Lessee may record this Lease, or upon

the request of Lessee, Lessor shall prepare and execute a Notice
of Lease which Lessee may record at its expense.

Lessee shall

deliver a copy of any such recorded Notice of Lease to Lessor.
16.
reliance

No

Otfrer As surances:

upon

its

Lessee makes

provisionsf

including

this

any

Lease

in

amendments,

supplements and extensions; and not in reliance upon any alleged
assurances, representations and warranties made by Lessor, or
Lessor's agents, servants or employees.
17.

Entire

Agreement:

This

Lease

contains

the

entire

understanding between the parties with respect to its subjectmatter, the Property and all aspects of the relationship between
Lessee and Lessor.
18.

Amendments

in

Writ ina:

No

alleged

modification,

termination or waiver of this Lease shall be binding unless it is
set out in writing and signed by the parties hereto.
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19.

Notices:

Where

this

Lease requires

notice

to

be

given, except where it expressly provides to the contraryr all
such notices shall be in writing and (except for those that are
delivered

by

hand)

shall

be

deemed

given

when

mailed

by

registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, or when sent by
telegram or cable, addressed to the party or Guarantor entitled
to receive the notice at his or its address as provided for such
purpose in this Lease or at such other address as the party or
Guarantor to receive the notice last may have designated for such
purpose by notice given to the other party,
20.

Addresses for Notices: The addresses for notices and

payments are:
LESSOR:

LESSEE:

21.

Attorney Fees:

In the event it becomes necessary for

any party to employ an attorney to enforce the terms of this
Agreement or protect his rights, the prevailing party shall be
entitled to reasonable attorney fees and court costs incurred
thereby.
22.

Brokers:

has not utilized

Each party represents to the other that it
the services of any real estate broker in

connection herewith.

In the event any claims or demands arise as
7

a result of the making of this Lease, each partu hereto covenants
and agrees to indemnify the other against any claims or demands
with respect to the making of this* Lease allegedly resulting from
arrangements or contracts made by the indemnifying party.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement
as of the date first above written.
LESSEE:

^

LESSOR:

^f-

STATE OF NEVADA

)
)

COUNTY OF CLARK

^v^c^^

ss:

)

(f°

£ </Z>day of
On this
personallv appeared before me, a Notary
•/
, who acknowl
foregoing Lease Agreement.

STATE OF NEVADA

)

COUNTY OF CLARK

)

)

f*ti
ted the

NOTARY PUBLIC
.STATE OF NEVADA
/ County of Claris
Patricia Crickenbe^erj
ss:

ifefr DocJ^iZSi!«
nunont ExP
Expires
' Appointme"'
-.

£

day
On this
^
personally appeared before me,
, who acknow
foregoing Lease. Agreement.

NOTARY PUBL
L NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF NEVADA
w.aa^p C^nty of Clark .
S
Petriaa Crickenberapr

E o & - a . i s » a a -7^-7

D 0 0 1 s=-

EXHIBIT A
VALUE
1. An undivided interest in land and improvements
located 18 miles Southwest of Moab, Utah, on the
Colorado River, consisting of 135 acres and water
rights to irrigate 39.5 acres; the legal
description of which is the following:
Parcel 1: All that certain lot, piece
and parcel of land lying situate and
being in San Juan County and known as the
NE 1/4 NE 1/4, Section 12, T. 27 S., R.
20 E., S. L. B. & M., Utah, containing 40
acres, more or less.
Parcel 2; All that certain lot, piece
and parcel of land lying situate and
being in San Juan County and being
described as follows: E 1/2 of the SE
1/4 SE 1/4, SE 1/4 NE 1/4"SE 1/4, Section
1, T. 27 S., R. 20 E., S. L. B. & M.,
Utah. Lots 11 and 12, Section 6; Lot 2,
Section 7; T. 27 S., R. 21 E., S. L. B. &
M., Township 37 South, Range 19 East, S.
L. B. & M., Section 16: San Juan
County.

$399,033.

^/

*27J Jog

/j cozo

E 0641E8 B 79 7 P 0014

STATE OF NEVADA
COUNTY OF CLARK

)
)
)

ss:

On t h i s _,
day of
p e r s o n a l l y ar>oeared b e f o r e me. a Notary Public,

_,,

19_,

Trustee of ___
, who acknowledged tov;me
r—- _^
that he executed the forgoing Lease Agreement on behalf of said
Trust.

NOTARY '-PUBLIC
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Exhibit "2"
Findings and Order

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
San Juan County

CRAIG C. HALLS #1317
Attorney for Plaintiff
333 South Main Street
Blanding, Utah 84511
Telephone: (435)678-3333
Facsimile: (435)678-3303

FILED

JAN 1 2 2005
CLERK OF THE COURT

BY_
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE TANGREN FAMILY TRUST,
by RICHARD TANGREN, TRUSTEE and
RICHARD TANGREN, individually,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 0207-46
RODNEY TANGREN,
Defendant.

THIS MATTER came before the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson on
the 25th day of August, 2004.

Plaintiff Richard Tangren,

individually and as trustee, was present and represented by Craig
C. Halls; Defendant Rodney Tangren was present and represented by
Matthew Jube.

This trial was suspended at the close of the first

day of testimony and the parties returned on the 17th day of
November, 2004, and the balance of the testimony was received by
the court; both parties were present and represented by counsel
as above stated.

The Court having received all of the evidence
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and having observed all of the witnesses, taken their testimony
and reviewed the exhibits, now makes the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The center of the dispute was a Lease dated in 1992 and

apparently signed by Richard Tangren, Paula Tangren and Rodney
Tangren.
2.

There was evidence that Paula Tangren's name had been

removed from the lease and from the notary certificate and the
lease had been resigned and notarized in 1994, with the
signatures of Richard Tangren and Rodney Tangren.
3.

The deletion of Mrs. Tangren's name in 1994 was

apparently done without objection of the Defendant.
4.

The Lease was recorded in 2001 after a falling out

between Richard Tangren and Rodney Tangren.
5.

From 1992 until the lease was filed in 2001, Richard

Tangren had been able to come and go from the subject property as
he pleased.
6.

There was disputed testimony as to whether or not the

lease was delivered when signed in 1992 or 1994, or whether it
was delivered prior to being recorded in 2001.
7.

The court believes that where testimony was

contradictory, the testimony of Richard Tangren was more

2

transparent and, therefore, the Court believed it to be more
truthful.
8.

The Court finds that the Defendant, and more

particularly his wife, was more meticulous in the records she
kept with regard to expenses or expenditures on the ranch
property, yet made no record of payments on the lease.
Therefore, the Court finds that there were no cash payments made
for the period of 19 92 through the present.
9.

The Court finds that the lease was prepared at the

behest of Richard Tangren, that he had advice of counsel with
regard to its terms and went against the advice of counsel.

The

Court finds that his actions against the counsel of his attorneys
in the execution and content of the lease is an indication of his
effort to make a concession to Rodney Tangren and that the
agreement would not come into effect unless there was a quarrel
or dispute with the Tangren siblings.
10.

The Court finds that based upon the foregoing, the

document noted in this litigation as the "Lease" was intended as
a protection against an incursion upon the Defendant by his
siblings and was not intended to govern actions as between
Richard Tangren and Rodney Tangren and both parties agreed and
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understood that it would only take effect if challenged by
Rodney's siblings.
11.

The Court finds that the "Lease" is not a valid

document.
12.

The Court finds that Rodney Tangren knew the "Lease"

was not intended as a functioning agreement between the Tangren
Trust and Defendant and was intended to protect Rodney from
incursions or challenges by his siblings.
13.

The Court finds that there was no reliance on the lease

document as a valid and binding lease by Rodney Tangren.
14.

As the Court has found the lease to be invalid, there

was no requirement to pay rent and thereby no rent is due from
Rodney Tangren to Richard Tangren.
15.

The Court finds that Rodney Tangren knew that the

agreement was not between he and Richard, but was to protect him
from his siblings and therefore, there was no fraud which induced
him or caused any damage to Rodney.
16.

With regard to the Defendant's unjust enrichment claim,

the Court does not find sufficient evidence to show that he
improved the property.

The value or evidence on expenditures was

just to maintain the property and did not increase the value of
the property.
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17.

The Court finds that there was no damage upon Rodney's

removal of the blinds from the property because there was no
evidence that the value of the property was diminished and the
carpet may have been replaced in any event.
18.

The Court finds that there was insufficient evidence to

determine damages under the Defendant's Counterclaims.
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

The claim of Richard Tangren for rents is denied and no

sum is awarded therefor.
2.

The counterclaim of Rodney Tangren for unjust enrichment

is denied and no sum is awarded therefor.
3.

The claim of Rodney Tangren for specific performance is

denied and no sum is awarded therefor.
4.

The claim of Rodney Tangren for reliance damages is

denied and no sum is awarded therefor.
5.

The claim of Rodney Tangren for fraud is denied and no

sum is awarded therefor.
6.

The Defendant may remove his personal property from the

premises and shall have six months, until May 18, 2 005, to remove
said property or the same shall be forever forfeited.
7.

Any items which have become fixtures to the property

shall remain on the property.
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8.

Each of the parties shall pay their own costs and

attorney fees incurred in pursuance of this action,
DATED this

day of jfiAl\J&A/L*

2005.

BY THE COURT:

Approved as to form
and content:

MATTHEW JUBE
Attorney for Defendant
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8.

Each of the parties shall pay their own costs and

attorney fees incurred in pursuance of this action.
DATED this

day of

, 2005.
BY THE COURTS

DISTRICT JUDGE

Apgroved as to form
tbeftt:

JEW JUBE

Attorney for Defendant
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